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This paper deals with the optimality of teacher incentive contracts in the presence of costly
or limited government resources. It considers educational production under asymmetric in-
formation as a function of teacher effort and class size. In the presence of costly government
resources and convex effort costs, teacher monitoring – which is wasteful in principle – may be
superior to merit pay in order to induce second-best teacher effort; optimum class size is not af-
fected by informational deﬁciencies. If the government budget is exogenously ﬁxed, optimum
teacher effort may not be affordable, which is shown to make the case for monitoring activity
instead of incentive pay even stronger.
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11 Introduction
We consider merit payandaccountability through monitoring asalternativesto provideoptimum
teacher effort which is a priori unobservable. While merit pay is a priori costless to society since
it consists of a pure transfer from the government to teachers, monitoring appears to be socially
wasteful since it is not productive in any sense – other than its contribution to uncover possibly
hidden teacher effort. Hence, there seems to be a strong case in favor of merit pay. However,
practical experience shows that merit pay is very rarely employed as teacher incentive program.
There is a strand of literature explaining the aversion to merit pay by the multidimensionality of
teacher effort which is hard to optimally tackle via incentive contracts (cf. Holmstrom and Mil-
grom, 1991 on the fundamental to incentivize agents in a multitasking framework). Our model
proposes another explanation: If government resources are costly, and teacher effort is not ob-
servable, the cost of teacher information rent may outweigh the cost associated with monitoring.
It is shown under which conditions – concerning effort costs, student attention, resource costs
and monitoring costs – monitoring is the preferred government policy from a social perspective
and how the decision depends on the optimum teacher effort’s interaction with class size and on
the nature of the government budget constraint.
A similar approach is taken by Jost (1991) who extends the general framework of principal-agent
relationships by – among others – Grossman and Hart (1993) by assuming that the principal has
the possibility of monitoring the agent at some ﬁxed cost. As opposed to the model presented in
this paper,he assumes that monitoring is imperfectand usedin parallelwith an incentive contract
to induce optimum behavior. In this setting, the principal is not able to commit himself to imple-
menting monitoring, he is thus tempted to save the monitoring costs. In our model, this problem
does not occur since we assume that the government can commit to its teacher reward and con-
trol policy. A more fundamental difference between the approach taken by Jost (1991) and ours is
that Jost uses a framework where the inefﬁciency in the allocation under asymmetric information
with hidden action is due to an inefﬁcient allocation of risk, while in our approach, agents are risk
neutral and the inefﬁciency results from the imposition of a limited liability constraint, protecting
the agent from negative transfers.
We start by discussing dimensions of teacher motivation (section 2) and teacher incentives (sec-
tion 3) before considering speciﬁc contracts in section 5.
2 Teacher Motivation
Spear, Gould, and Lee (2000) present evidence that a teaching career scores highly for undergrad-
uates on the opportunities given for having creative input, beneﬁting society, and working with
individuals. The most common reasons are job satisfaction and working with children. The rea-
sons rated as least important included working hours, holidays, salaries and security. It seems
that prospective teachers are principally attracted to the profession by the rewarding nature of
the work involved, as opposed to the pay or conditions on offer.
It is obvious that teacher motivation and morale are of eminent importance in determining stu-
dents’ educational achievement. Studies analyzed by Spear, Gould, and Lee (2000) reveal that
teachers believe their own morale to be largely determined by their quality of life within the
2school, rating factors such as good relations with pupils and helping pupils to achieve as very
important. When asked to name those factors that they felt could have a positive effect on the
morale of the profession as a whole, teachers’ responses largely relate to factors external to the
process of teaching itself, focusing on a more positive portrayal of the teaching profession by the
media, increased pay and conditions and less pressure. It seems that to improve both the morale
of individual teachers and the ethos of the profession as a whole, a range of measures is needed,
addressing both experiences integral to the work of teaching, and factors linked to the structural
and social context within which that work is carried out.
The main factor found to contribute to the job satisfaction of teachers is working with children.
Additional factors included developing warm, personal relationships with pupils, the intellectual
challenge of teaching as well as autonomy and independence. In contrast, teachers viewed job
dissatisfaction as principally contributed to by work overload, poor pay and perceptions of how
teachers are viewed by society.
In order to experience high job satisfaction, teachers need an intellectual challenge, their auton-
omy, to feel that they are beneﬁting society, to enjoy good relations with their colleagues and to
spend a sufﬁcient proportion of their time working with children. Enhanced pay, improved sta-
tus, a less demanding workload and fewer administrative responsibilities should result in lower
levels of job dissatisfaction among teachers, but will not necessarily bring about higher levels of
job satisfaction.
It is clear that modelling teacher effort in just one dimension misses important aspects of what
teachers do and how they take decisions about their teaching, i.e. how to provide a motivating
and stimulating learning ambiance and how to foster the development of their intellectual and
social skills. Although considering only pecuniary incentives and focusing on one generic task,
we are well aware that other aspects are equally important but are to subject to a methodics and
didactics, ﬁelds economics have little to contribute to.
3 Teacher Incentives
As discussed in the introduction, the literature discerns incentives systems which work within
schools broadly into the two categories accountability and merit pay. While accountability sys-
tems per se provide an objective evaluation of teacher or student performance, they can be imple-
mented directly by committing teachers or schools to certain student achievement levels – with
or without explicit consequences for teachers or schools – or indirectly in the context of a merit
pay scheme where veriﬁable standards serve as a proxy for teacher “merit” which can then be
possibly contracted upon.
3.1 Accountability
By accountability we mean the establishment of some form of standards external to individual
educational institutions and using tests to assure that teachers or entire schools are doing their
best to meet the standards.
The problem of designing incentive compatible contracts is not unique to the situation in schools.
Baker (1992) analyzes optimum contracts if an agent’s payoff cannot be based on the principal’s
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mance measure. Prendergast (1999) reviews the literature on the provision of incentives in ﬁrms
and concludes that agency theory indeed provides an important framework for understanding
and designing compensation schemes. However, empirical evidence about their performance is
largely missing. Lazear (2000) provides such evidence and extends the analysis of the impact of
incentives on performance to their role in the determination and selection of the workforce. He
ﬁnds that well designed monetary incentives (in a sector whereeffortis one-dimensional and well
measurable) indeed attract more able workers and increase the output level and the variance in
output across individuals.
Considering performance systems in public organizations, Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002)
examine the performance of the job training partnership act (JTPA) in 1993 as a prototype of a
performance-standard incentive program. They ﬁnd that performance standards in public ser-
vice did not promote efﬁciency because the short-term outcomes they rely on had only little cor-
relation with with long-run impacts on employment and earnings. Consequentially, also in that
setting it has to be concluded that people respond to incentives, although perversely so if perfor-
mance is only poorly measurable. The same conclusion is drawn by Koretz (2002) who reviews
empirical evidence and discusses the logic of achievement tests in the U.S. His main argument
is that tests exclude entire subject areas, leave many important goals of education unmeasured
and elide attributes which schools are also supposed to foster, such as the interest in learning,
and intellectual curiosity. Among the potential perverse effects of accountability are two forms of
“coaching”:
Reallocatingachievement Teachers may emphasizecertain subjects andreallocateinstructional
resources to focus more on content deemed important or particularly well testable.
Cheating Koretz (2002)reports about incidents in which educators told students which answers
to change or gave them practice tests containing questions from operational tests.
On the basis of the general literature on incentive contracts and performance measurement, it is
evident that a system of standards,accountability, and sanctions in schools must be well designed
andwellimplementedin ordertoachievesome effectiveness. However, itisfarfromobvious how
to design such a system, especially when differing political and other forces inﬂuence the design.
One major problem is that standards in education may not be adequate for different classes: If
there is exogenous heterogeneity, too low or too high standards which are too easily or not at all
attainable may crowd out intrinsic motivation. Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Prendergast (1999)
show that relative performance measures and rank-ordertournaments are able to avoid problems
associated with the level of standards. Kane and Staiger (2001) argue that accountability systems
tend to over-reward and over-penalize small institutions which are likely to display unusually
high or low performance, simply because noisy measures of students’ achievement are less likely
to average out. Systems with discrete cut-off levels tend to focus teacher effort on the students
whose performance is just below a cut-off level. Therefore, Betts and Grogger (2000) suggest a
relative performance hypothesis to explain how higher standards may reduce educational attain-
ment (overall graduation rate) even as they increase educational achievement (test scores).
A potential problem of accountability measuresis their narrowness: Jacob(2002)shows that gains
in math and reading achievement due to an accountability policy in Chicago public schools in
41996-97 were largely driven by increases in test-speciﬁc skills and student effort. Teachers re-
sponded strategically to incentives, diverting effort from non-veriﬁable dimensions by increasing
special education placements, preemptively retaining students and substituting away from low-
stakes subjects like science and social studies.
Kane and Staiger (2002)argue that a test-based school accountability systems should exhibit three
features that are currently lacking from most accountability systems in use: First, one should re-
ward entire schools which have attained persistently high test scores over many years to increase
the reliability of the performance estimate. Second, schools should be sorted into separate sized
classes to account for the fact that smaller schools have more variable performance measures. An
third, in order to preserve incentives in the short run, the optimal contract would reward schools
for exceeding their expected performance, the size of incentive payments depending on the relia-
bility of test scores measures.
The Dallas school accountability and incentive program which started in 1991 stands out from
other incentive programs in the sophistication of its methodology for ranking schools (cf. Ladd,
1999). There, the full adjustment of individual test scores for the socioeconomic status of the
students assures that the estimated value-added measures are not biased toward schools serving
more advantagedchildren. In orderto avoid narrowteaching to speciﬁc tests, the system relies on
multiple measures of student outcomes, including two tests given annually, a criterion-referenced
state test tied to the state curriculum and a nationally normed test. In addition, these tests aresup-
plemented with a variety of other end-of-course tests and school-wide measures, such as student
attendance and drop-out rates. In all cases, the measurement of student and school gains are
measured relative to the average rather than some absolute value. Evaluating the program, Ladd
(1999) concludes that there is a potential for it to have a positive impact on student outcomes. In
seventh grade, results are consistently positive, though not for all ethnic groups alike. An other
positive change is the fall in the Dallas drop-out rate relative to that in other cities. Hence, a
well designed incentive program is at least potentially fruitful, albeit at high administrative and
organizational costs. Consequently, states in the U.S. have lately moved away from developing
teacher-speciﬁc incentive systems and toward group ratings and accountability (cf. Hanushek
and Raymond (2004)).
In many countries, there is a system of school inspection using monitoring by on-site visits and
expert judgement to identify schools with problems and applying pressure to improve perfor-
mance. This is a ﬂexible alternative to accountability based on tests; it avoids problems arising
from imposing external demands on schools that are performing well, distorting teaching behav-
ior and narrowing the range of curricular objectives. For example in England and Wales, since
1992, educational standards of public schools are assured and imposed through inspection by a
government agency. The four objectives for these inspections named by the Ofﬁce for Standards
in Education are (1) raising standards of achievement by students, (2) enhancing the quality of
educational experience enjoyed by pupils, (3) increasing the efﬁciency of the ﬁnancial manage-
ment of schools and (4) developing the ethos of the school (Ofsted, 1995).Ofsted (1995) In the
model presented in section 3, we assume that monitoring allows the government to fully observe
teacher effort at a positive social cost. This is the downside of on-site-visits compared to pure
incentive contracts such as merit pay which comprise basically costless transfers only.1
1Rosenthal (2004) presents evidence that school inspections have an adverse effect on exam performance. However,
inspections occur only once every four years or more, such that the reported results may be due to the inspections’ inter-
53.2 Merit Pay
There are two broad approaches to providing monetary incentives to teachers for good perfor-
mance:
Individual merit pay Merit pay which is assigned to individual teachers for their contribution
to learning performance in a given time period, either based on an internal evaluation or more
objective measures such as test results.
Group ratings Awards to whole school establishments in the form of a bonus divided between
all members of the team involved in educational production.
In general, it seems very sensible to introduce monetary incentives to individuals. Lazear (2000)
ﬁnds that in an auto glass company, productivity effects amounted to a 44 percent increase in out-
put per worker once it shifted to piece rates. Lazear and Rosen (1981)show theoretically that also
rank-order tournaments can induce the same efﬁcient allocation of resources as a reward scheme
based on individual output levels. Notwithstanding these encouraging studies, performance pay
in educational institutions is very controversial. Hanushek (1994) and his co-authors are in favor
of providing monetary incentives to individuals in education systems for good performance but
recognize that there are difﬁculties, especially in changing from current systems to others based
on strong incentives. They conclude that “in practice, designing a workable system of merit pay
has proved elusive” (p. 95). The main problem in individual merit pay is that it relies on a too
narrow band of incentives: a salary supplement and presumably status beneﬁts. However, there
are many different satisfactions to teachers of which monetary rewards are considered the least
salient, such that they are not compelling to most teachers; thus, the reward offered is not partic-
ularly attractive. Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2003) report on a program that provided primary
school teachers in Kenya with incentives based on students’ test scores. They ﬁnd that students
in program schools had indeed higher test scores during the time the program was in place, how-
ever, an examination of the channels through which this effecttook placeprovides “little evidence
that teachers responded to the program by steps to reduce dropouts or increasing effort on stimu-
lating long-run learning” (p. 31). Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002) review empirical evidence
on the inﬂuence of merit pay schemes on student achievement across the U.S. Their results sug-
gest that merit may indeed motivates teachers to produce outcomes which are directly rewarded
– in their case increased student retention. However, there are also unintended results such as de-
teriorated average achievement due to the complex organization of schools with multiple teacher
tasks, team production and multiple stakeholders. A very successful introduction of merit pay
is evaluated by Lavy (2002, 2003, 2004 ) who ﬁnds that a rank-order tournament among teachers
as a monetary performance incentive program in Israeli secondary schooling caused signiﬁcant
gains in many dimensions of students’ educational achievement and that this programme is more
cost-effective than alternative forms of intervention such as extra instruction time.
Lazear (2003) argues that observed positive effects of output-based pay may be due to a teacher
sorting effect: Pay based on student achievement scores favors higher ability teachers relative to
lower ability ones, where ability is deﬁned in terms of the teacher’s ability to raise achievement
action with more pressing and continuous inﬂuence on schools by annual puclication and public scrutiny of comparative
exam and test scores.
6scores. This effect may introduce a distortion in teacher hiring: If there are teachers who are good
at raising test scores, but not at raising non-testable student performance, then pay based on test
scores attracts those teachers who are capable at the former without getting those who excel on
the latter.
Overall, it can be concluded that the concept of individual merit pay is theoretically very attrac-
tive while in practice the empirical evidence on its effectiveness is mixed. Potential problems
with individual merit pay are: (1) that merit pay may interfere with schools’ efforts to promote
good teacher performance through pedagogical leadership, encouragement and steps to improve
teacher morale; and (2) that it tends to introduce an adversarial atmosphere and create incentives
to conceal problems.
A complement to individual merit pay in order to circumvent the above-mentioned problems
may be the introduction of merit awards to whole schools. Ladd (1999) studies the experiment
with school-based awards in Dallas and ﬁnds mixed evidence for a positive effect of such an
incentive programon student performance. Awardstowhole schools avoidmany ofthe problems
of individual merit pay, including the problem of damage to the institutional environment inside
the school. However, it introduces the problem of free riding among teachers if social control
within a school is weak.
4 Outline of the Model
Our model focuses on one-dimensional teacher effort and performance pay for individual teach-
ers. The education process involves the sequence of events as displayed in ﬁgure 1.
Figure 1





Government sets teacher pay schedule, class size and monitoring;
Teacher chooses eﬀort;
Nature resolves risk.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government ﬁxes its education policy which is fully characterized by pre-
scribedclasssize,teacherremunerationscheduleandpossibly monitoring activitiesto learnabout
teacher effort. Subsequently, teachers decide on their effort which is – together with class size – a
determinant of their students’ success probability. In the third stage, nature resolves risk and the
government pays teachers according to their wage schedule.
We assume the government to be benevolent, maximizing a simple utilitarian social welfare func-
tion over its budget constraint.
5 Educational Production
Educational production consists of providing students with a probability P to succeed. Student
success as a result of educational production is a very abstract concept deserving detailed ap-
praisal of its own. In the context of this paper we simply assume that schooling success is mea-
surable as for example in external tests as discussed in section 3.1. Then, the passing of these tests
7may be either a prerequisite to move on to higher education or enable students to ﬁnd highly
qualiﬁed jobs. We are, however, well aware that such test are limited to only a few dimensions
of educational outcomes. Hence, a comprehensive analysis would have to include an in-depth
discussion of the very goals of education in schools (productivity, literacy, citizenship), and the
multi-dimensionality of inputs in educational production (cf. e.g. Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1991
and Holmstr¨ om, 1982). For the sake of simplicity and focus on the goal of this paper – to give a
partial explanation of monitoring regimes at school – we abstract from these issues.
Success probability is a (positive linear) function of teacher effort and class size in the sense of
Lazear(2001): When one student disrupts classwork, the entire class suffers; the teacher’s and the
other students’ concentration is diverted from studying. Let π be the probability that a student
is not misbehaving at any moment in time. Then, the probability that all students in a class of
size m are behaving is πm which is also equal to the proportion of schooling time during which
students areeffectivelystudying. Thus, the studentsuccess probability P is givenby thefollowing
educational production function:
P = eπm π  = 1 (1)
where e is teacher effort, m is class size, and π is the individual probability of non-disruption.
Teachers incur a disutility from exerting teaching effort. They are risk neutral and have separable
preferences over their wage T and their disutility of effort U = T − η (e). The disutility of effort
function η (e) is increasing and convex in e with η (0) = 0. For simplicity, we assume an effort
cost function of the form
η (e) = eγ γ > 1,
with γ large enough to assure interior solutions. The teacher has an outside option of value V = 0
which forces the government to pay the teacher a transfer equal to her effort cost plus the value
of her outside option V. In the following of the paper, we analyze the effect of two different
government budget regimes on educational production: unlimited but costly resources and an
exogenously ﬁxed government budget.
5.1 Costly Government Resources
We start by assuming that the government disposes of unlimited but costly resources. Resource
costs can be thought of as the excess burden of the taxation which is necessary to ﬁnance public
education. Thus, the potential welfare effects of asymmetric information are not restricted to
an inefﬁcient allocation but include also the cost of ﬁnancing teachers’ information rents. For
simplicity, we assume a constant cost λ > 0 per monetary unit.
5.1.1 Symmetric Information
As a benchmark case, we assume symmetric information. Thus, the government can observe and
contract upon teacher effort. Given the teacher’s outside option V = 0, the government solves
the per-student problem (Π∗)
Π∗ : W∗ = max
e∈[0,1],m∈R+
Ps + (1 − P)s −
1
m
η (e)(1 + λ). (2)
8In the government problem Π∗, s denotes the social value of a successful student, while s is the
social value of an unsuccessful student. By the term social value we refer to a society’s total beneﬁt
from an individual due to her education which consists of her wage and reputation as well as
external beneﬁts such as good citizenship or the enabling of others’ productivity.2
To make the case of symmetric information valuable as a benchmark for the allocation under
asymmetric information, we have to assume that the government cannot commit itself to its
choice of teacher effort until class size has been ﬁxed. Thus, P∗ has to be solved backwards
in order to obtain a time consistent solution. By the convexity of η(e), the government’s objec-
tive function is strictly concave in e, and direct optimization leads to the following ﬁrst-order-
condition deﬁning the ﬁrst-best level of effort under symmetric information:
mπm (s − s)
! = (1+ λ)η′ (e). (3)
This is the Samuelson condition for the efﬁcient provision of teacher effort in class which is a
public good within a classroom by (1). It equates the total marginal beneﬁt of teacher effort to
marginal cost.
Optimization with respect to m yields










By the ﬁrst-order-condition (3) deﬁning e∗, the second term on the left hand side and the second
term on the right hand side cancel each other. Again, the total marginal cost from increasing class
size marginally must equal the marginal beneﬁt consisting of lower effort cost per student. From
(3) and (4) it follows directly that e∗ and m∗ are given by
e∗ =
 










Figure 2 illustrates optimum teacher effort, total studying time in class, student success probabil-
ity, and welfare in an example where the parameters are arbitrarily set to π = 0.9, γ = 2, s = 1,
s = 0, λ = 0.4.
5.1.2 Asymmetric Information
In the case of asymmetric information, if teacher effort is not observable, the government has to
take account of a teacher’s incentive structure. Usually, in the context of a model with moral
hazard, there is a rent extraction vs. efﬁciency trade-off faced by the principal. This is also the
2The evidence on external beneﬁts from education is controversial: Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) ﬁnd no external
returns in the labor market while Lochner and Moretti (2001) report that individuals who obtain more education because
laws prevent them from dropping out of school are less likely to commit a crime. Also, Dee (2003) ﬁnds that education
has signiﬁcant effects on subsequent voter participation, support for free speech and frequency of newspaper readership.
This suggests that there might indeed be important nonmarket and social effects from education.
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The ﬁrst-best reactions of teacher effort, studying time and















case here, but in an alleviated form: Since teacher rent is part of overall welfare, the government
as principal has no a priori interest in rent extraction. However, because resources are costly, it
minimizes expenditure in order to keep the social burden from sourcing small. The government




per student where t = b is the teacher’s base salary
which she earns in case the student fails, and t = b + M ≥ t which contains an extra merit pay M
if the student succeeds. Solving backwards, the risk-neutral teacher chooses effort e such that
e = arg max
  e∈[0,1]
mPt + m(1 − P)t − η (  e).
By the strict concavity of the teacher’s objective function, the incentive constraint rewrites with
the following necessary and sufﬁcient ﬁrst-order-condition:
IC : mπm  
t − t
 
= η′ (e). (7)
The teacher’s participation constraint is given by the condition that the expected transfer minus
her intangible effort costs at least balance the value of her outside option V = 0:
PC : mPt + m(1− P)t − η (e) ≥ V. (8)
Furthermore, we assume that teachers are protected by limited liability constraints which restrict
government transfers to be non-negative in either state:
LLC1 : t ≥ 0; (9)
LLC2 : t ≥ 0. (10)
Without limited liability constraints, the government could still implement a ﬁrst-best allocation
– even in the case of asymmetric information with respect to teacher effort. However, this would
imply a negative transfer in the case of the bad state, which is not a feasible policy option in terms
of teacherremuneration.3 When the ﬁrst of these constraints is binding, the government is limited
in its punishments in bad states. In order to maintain teacher incentives by the optimum wedge
between t and t, the government has to raise its transfers in the good state. As a result, the teacher
3For an in-depth discussion of limited liability constraits in a principal-agent setting see eg. Sappington (1983).
10receives a non-negative ex ante limited liability rent described in result 1 below as a special form
of information rent. The government’s per-student problem is thus
ΠSB : WSB = max
{(e,m,t,t)}
Ps + (1 − P)s − λ
 






subject to (7), (8), (9) and (10).
A preliminary result on
 
ΠSB 
is given in result 1.













Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.1.
Figure 3 displays a teacher’s effort cost η (e) and the total transfers T = mPt
SB = eη′ (e) by IC
and T = 0 by LLC1.
Figure 3











mπm in the government’s objective function, the reduced problem is written as
Π′SB : W′SB = max
e∈[0,1],m∈R+







When η′′′ > 0 the government’s objective function is strictly concave in e, and direct optimization
leads again to the following ﬁrst order conditions deﬁning the second-best level of effort eSB and
mSB:
mπm (s − s)
! = λeη′′ (e) + η′ (e)(1 + λ); (12)





λeη′ (e) + η (e)
 
. (13)
Result 2 In the second-best allocation, (a) teacher effort is inefﬁciently low, eSB < e∗, while (b) classes are
of efﬁcient size: mSB = m∗.
11Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.2.
The ﬁrst-best effort is such that the marginal beneﬁt mπm (s − s) of increasing effort by a small
amount de is just equal to the marginal disutility of doing so (1 + λ)η′ (e∗). Under moral haz-
ard, the marginal beneﬁt mπm (s − s) must be equal to the marginal cost (1+ λ)η′  
eSB 
plus
the cost of the teacher’s marginal limited liability rent λeSBη′′  
eSB 
. Figure 4 shows optimum
teacher effort, total studying time in class, student success probability, and welfare with the same
parametrization as in ﬁgure 2.
Figure 4
The second-best reactions of teacher effort,















Note that – as indicated in result 2 – welfare is maximized at the same class size m∗ as under sym-
metric information. However, teacher effort is unambiguously lower due to its non-observability.
5.1.3 Monitoring
In the case of symmetric information, no monitoring is needed to induce optimum teaching effort
since it can be contracted due to its observability. Since asymmetric information with no binding
limited liability constraint yields ﬁrst-best results, no monitoring is needed then, either. If effort
is not observable without monitoring and a limited liability constraint is binding, however, this
may be a valuable alternative to induce optimum effort by incentive contracts. We assume that
teacher effort e is observable and enforceable by the government if it employs monitoring. This
means that the incentive constraint IC in the government problem no longer holds. The cost ψ(e)
of monitoring teacher effort is assumed to be linear in η (e) with a factor of proportionality µ :






Ps + (1− P)s −
1
m
η (e)(1 + λ)(1+ µ).
Direct optimization leads to the following ﬁrst order condition deﬁning the second-best levels of
effort and class size eSB
M and mSB
M :
mπm (s − s)
! = η′ (e)(1+ λ)(1 + µ); (14)




η (e)(1+ λ)(1 + µ). (15)
12Result 3 With hidden teacher effort, the following properties hold:
(a) eSB





M = mSB ∀ µ;




(γ − 1). (16)
Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.3.
To illustrate result (c) in result 3, consider what would happen if λ = 0. Then, the government
does not care whether or not to concede a limited liability rent to the teacher since it’s a costless
transfer which does not change overall welfare. Thus, LLC1 does not have to hold with equality
anymore. Therefore, even under asymmetric information, the ﬁrst-best allocation can be attained,
which – in the case of monitoring – were only possible if µ = 0. Choosing its optimum policy, the
government compares the cost of a teacher’s information rent eγ (γ − 1)λ to the cost of monitor-
ing her effort µeγ (1 + λ).
Figure 5
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Figure 5 illustrates the decision between monitoring and merit pay as a means of inducing op-
timum teacher effort. Both effort and welfare do not depend on monitoring cost µ if there is no
monitoring. However, in case of monitoring, an optimizing government adjusts intended teacher
effort according to µ due to its welfare implications. Hence, beneath a pivotal level of µ it is so-
cially favorable to rely on monitoring. The concurrence of the intersection of the level of optimum
effort and welfare under asymmetric information with their respective values in case of monitor-
ing is due to the fact that optimum class size is not affected by asymmetric information which
makes welfare directly dependent on teacher effort only.
5.1.4 Arbitrary Participation Constraint
So far, we have assumed a teacher outside option of value V = 0 which is never binding in the
presence of a limited liability constraint. In this section, we generalize the participation constraint
to any – possibly binding – value V ∈ R.
13SymmetricInformation Undersymmetric information with an arbitrary teacheroutsideoption
V, P∗ rewrites as
Π∗ : WV∗ = max
e∈[0,1],m∈R+
Ps + (1− P)s −
1
m






















Note that optimum teacher effort depends on V only indirectly via class size.
AsymmetricInformation Underasymmetricinformation, therearetwomutually exclusivecases
to be considered: In the ﬁrst case LLC1 is binding, in the second case PC is binding.
Result 4 (a) With limited liability, only IC and LLC1 are binding if V < eη′ (e) − η (e). Optimal












(b) With limited liability, only IC and PC are binding if V ≥ eη′ (e) − η (e). Optimal transfers per












SB = tSB +
η′ (e)
mπm .
The teacher’s expected limited liability rent exceeding the value of her outside option is equal to zero.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.5.
Result 5 (a) In the second-best allocation with a binding LLC1,
(a1) teacher effort is inefﬁciently low, eSB < e∗, while
(a2) classes are inefﬁciently small iff there is a positive outside option to teachers: mSB < m∗ ⇐⇒ V > 0.
(b) If PC is binding, the ﬁrst best allocation is achievable even under asymmetric information.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.6.
In the case of asymmetric information with a binding participation constraint, no monitoring is
needed, since the limited liability rent is dissipated by the compensation of the teacher’s outside
option.
14Monitoring Rule With V  = 0 and if the limited liability constraint LLC1is binding, there is no
closed-form solution for the set of µ where monitoring is favorable to merit pay. An increase in
V has the following effects: Without monitoring, welfare W′SB remains constant as long as LLC1
















(1+ λ)(1 + µ)− λ
mSB
M









Thus, the range of µ where monitoring outperforms merit pay decreases.
5.2 Fixed Government Resources
Contrary to the section above, we now assume that government expenditure is not costly, but
ﬁxed at a per-student-level g. The line of the argument remains basically the same, with the
differencethat optimum teacher effort e∗ may not be attainable anymore due to lacking resources.
We return to the assumption that V = 0. The government program is now
ΠΓ : WΓ = max
e∈[0,1],m∈R+Ps+ (1− P)s − c (17)
s.t. t ≤ g




mη (e) no monitoring;
1
mη (e)(1 + µ) monitoring.






mη (e) symmetric information;
1
meη′ (e) asymmetric information;
1
mη (e)(1+ µ) asymmetric information, monitoring.
(18)
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to e and m are exactly the same as in the case of costly
but unlimited government resources. With ﬁxed resources, the third ﬁrst-order-condition with
respect to the Lagrangian multiplier λ has to be considered in addition. We will just state the
results in this section and refer to appendix B for the calculations. With λ being the Lagrangian
multiplier attached to the government budget constraint, optimum class size and teacher effort
are given by equations (24) and (25) in the appendix. It can be checked easily that result 2 also
holds with a ﬁxed government budget. Once class size has been chosen, teacher effort is deter-
mined as well if the budget constraint is binding. According to (26) in the appendix, in the case
of asymmetric information and extremely scarce resources, monitoring is socially preferable to
teacher merit pay if
µ < γ − 1. (19)
The assumption of extremely scarce resources implies a high shadow price λ. Thus, in this case,
the conditions (19) and (16) coincide. Compare (19) to (26) to see that the more government re-
sources are available, the weaker the case for monitoring activity instead of incentive pay. Hence,
15an increase in the ﬁxed government budget makes monitoring less attractive as indicated in ﬁg-
ure 6 which displays µ that leaves the benevolent government indifferent between monitoring
and merit pay – provided that the government’s budget constraint is binding. When the budget
constraint gets slack, there will be no monitoring since the ﬁrst-best allocation can be attained
anyway.
Figure 6
Pivotal values of µ in the regime choice problem
(illustration).


























With increasing government resources, the model exhibits local non-monotonicities in human
capital production (see ﬁgure 7). This effect is due to the regime change from incentive contracts
to monitoring as available government resources increase.
Result 6 Assume µ < γ − 1 and starting at g = 0, with growing value of g, there is a switch in the
regime of optimum teacher incentives occurring at




























Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.7.
The regime change may introduce multiple equilibria in a growth model where human capital is
an argument in the ﬁnal output production function. Consider for example a toy model where a
fraction σ of the gross social beneﬁt of education is re-invested in educational production. Then,
in analogy to a simple neoclassical growth model, the differential equation of government expen-
diture can be written as
 
g = σ(P∆s + s) − g.
In such a setting, the non-monotonicity in the production of human capital leads – under certain
parameter constellations – to multiple equilibria characterized by
 
g = 0. Such a situation is
depicted in ﬁgure 8 where there are two stable equilibria:
g = σ(P∆s + s).
Such effects in the production of an important factor of economic growth may help explain the
lack of convergence established in the empirical literature (cf. Hall and Jones, 1999 and Barro and
Sala-I-Martin, 2004).
This effect is similar to the one in Eicher and Penalosa (2003) who base their analysis on Murphy,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) where multiple equilibria arise due to endogenous institutions.
16Figure 7
Pivotal values of µ in the regime choice problem
(illustration).
Figure 8
Stable equilibria in the growth process of
government resources (illustration).
5.3 The Impact of Student Behavior
We have observed that optimum educational policy is directly affected by the disposition of the
government’s resources. In the same model setting, the impact of change in the student charac-
teristics parameter π can be analyzed as well. The result is reported in result 7.
Result 7 (a) Optimum class size is increasing in the probability π that students behave well. (b) Total
studying time is constant in the probability π that students behave well. (c) Optimum teacher effort
increases in the probability π that students behave well.
Proof. The proof is given in appendix A.4.
Result 7 states that if π is observable, school authorities place better behaved students in larger
classes. It implicitly assumes that it is optimal to segregate students according to their character-
istic π in the ﬁrst place. This is indeed the case in the present model as can be easily shown. For
a proof of this result in a similar context, see Jaag (2005).
The result that class size is adjusted in response to student behavior impairs the possibility to ﬁnd
improved educational output when class size is reduced. Although more disruptive students
are found in smaller classes, the effect of reducing class size is not sufﬁcient to compensate their
deﬁciencies. Hence, the congruity of common sense with the failure to ﬁnd class size effects is
restored once sorting effects are taken into consideration. Result 7 replicates propositions 1 and 2
in Lazear (2001) where teacher effort is kept constant over student characteristic π.
176 Conclusion
The model developed in this paper is very parsimonious. A more thorough modeling of the
process of educational production which goes beyond the restriction of government and teachers
as the two sole actors seems a promising direction for future research. E.g. students and their
parents might be introduced as independent actors. Another extension of the model would be to
include other educational resources than teacher effort or a more accurate description of teacher
preferences.
While abstracting from these issues, the model presented in this paper is still capable of depicting
the interaction between class size and teacher effort in educational production. The model shows
that class size is adjusted in response to student behavior if the latter is publicly observable. This
impairs the possibility to ﬁnd improved educational output when class size is reduced. Although
more disruptive students are found in smaller classes, the effect of reducing class size is not sufﬁ-
cient to compensate their deﬁciencies. Hence, the congruity of common sense with the failure to
ﬁnd class size effects is restored once sorting effects are taken into consideration.
The value of the teachers’ outside option plays an important role in determining which policy is
preferred: If it is such that the teacher’s participation constraint is binding, there is no social cost
from incentivizing teachers, thus no monitoring is ever required. If the participation constraint is
slack, the teacher’s limited liability constraint binds, thus introducing the possibility of a welfare
increasing switch in policy. If government resources are available at a linear cost, monitoring is
socially favorable as long as its costs lie below a certain threshold value which is a function of the
convexity of teachereffortcost and government resourcecost. If maximum government resources
are ﬁxed and the budget constraint is binding, then an increase in the ﬁxed budget weakens
the case for monitoring activity instead of incentive pay. Hence, an increase in the government
budget makes monitoring less attractive. When the budget constraint gets slack, there will be no
monitoring since the ﬁrst-best allocation is attainable even under asymmetric information, thus
rendering monitoring unnecessary.
The model allows to understand why incentive contracts are rarely employed in schools: If gov-
ernment resources are scarce, there is a social cost attached to incentivize teachers, such that other
forms of stimulation may be more effective. More generally, a central implication of this paper
is that institutional policies are potentially at least as important in guaranteeing a high quality
in educational production than sole resource policies. From a macroeconomic perspective, the
model may introduce multiple equilibria in growth settings, where human capital is an argument
in the ﬁnal output production function. Such effects in the production of an important factor of
economic growth may help explain the lack of convergence established in the empirical literature
(cf. eg. Hall and Jones, 1999).
18Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof to Result 1
We conjecture that (7) and (9) are the only relevant constraints. Both constraints are binding since




that (10) is satisﬁed since
η′(e)
mπm ≥ 0. We also check that (8) is satisﬁed by the convexity of η (e),
η′ (0) = 0, and the fact that eSB > 0. This also proves the positivity of the limited liability rent.
A.2 Proof to Result 2
Solve (12) for e to get
eSB =
 





This solution is unique due to the concavity of P
′SB in e. Comparing (20) to (5) yields result (a) in










m>mSB < 0, mSB





Comparing (21) to (6) yields result (b) in the result.
A.3 Proof to Result 3




mπm (s − s)













































Comparing (15) to (21) yields result (b) in the result. Result (c) holds by (a) and (b) and the fact
that the cost terms in (P′SB) and (P′SB
M ) coincide iff µ = λ
γ−1
1+λ.
19A.4 Proof to Result 7
(a) Differentiate m∗ with respect to π to ﬁnd ∂m∗
∂π = 1
πγ(lnπ)
2 < 0. (b) Studying time is given by
πm. Differentiate with respect to π to get ∂πm
∂π = 0. (c) Substitute m∗ into (5), (20), or (22) and
differentiate with respect to π to get the result.
A.5 Proof to Result 4
(a) We conjecture that (7) and (9) are the only relevant constraints. Both constraints are binding




check that (10) is satisﬁed since
η′(e)
mπm ≥ 0. We also check that (8) is satisﬁed since by the condition
V < eη′ (e) − η (e). This also proves the positivity of the limited liability rent.
(b) We conjecture that (7) and (8) are the only relevant constraints. Both constraints are binding





SB = tSB +
η′(e)
mπm. We check that (9) is satisﬁed by the condition V ≥ eη′ (e) − η (e). We also
check that (10) is satisﬁed since
η′(e)
mπm ≥ 0. The expected excess limited liability rent is given by
PtSB + (1− P)tSB − V − η (e) = 0.
A.6 Proof to Result 5
(a) Solve (12) for e to get
eSB =
 





















Comparing (21) to (6) yields result (a2) in the result.
(b) Replacing t
SB and tSB in the government’s objective function and exploiting the ﬁrst-order
conditions yields the same optimum levels of e and m as with symmetric information.
A.7 Proof to Result
By insertion, note that   g satisﬁes WSB
Γ = WSB
Γ,M with WSB


















(1+ µ). This proves the existence of a change in the
regime. Note also that WSB
Γ
   
g=0 > WSB
Γ,M















. Once g has reached a
value such that the government budget constraint is no longer binding, there will be no monitor-
ing anyway. Thus,   g is the only value of g satisfying WSB
Γ = WSB
Γ,M.
20B Fixed Government Resources
With ﬁxed government resources, there are basically two cases to be considered, in both scenarios
of symmetric information and hidden effort. In the ﬁrst case, the budget constraint is slack, which
implies that government resourcesarefree. This result correspondsto the one in section 5.1.2with
λ = 0. The budget constraint is slack if
g >

   



















Since in this case the ﬁrst-best allocation is attainable even under asymmetric information, there
will never be wasteful monitoring (see result 3). In the second case, the budget constraint is
binding. This is what we assume in the following. Thus, the government program is given by
equations (17)-(18).
Symmetric information With symmetric information, exploiting the ﬁrst-order conditions
eπm lnπ (s − s) = −
1 + λ
m2 η (e);



















Asymmetric information with a binding participation constraint In the case of unobservable
teacher effort, if the government undertakes no monitoring and if PC is binding, the ﬁrst-best
allocation results since by result 4, LLC1 is not binding. No monitoring will be needed to induce
optimum teacher effort.
Asymmetric information with a binding limited liability constraint In the case of unobserv-
















By result 5, PC is not binding in this case, thus V does not enter the optimization problem. Note
that with V = 0, optimum class size is not affectedby the non-observability of teacher effort. This
is due to the fact that decreasing class size is costless per se; it burdens the budget only via its
interaction with teacher effort.
21Asymmetric information with monitoring In the case of asymmetric information with moni-


































(1 + µ) to ﬁnd that, in the case of asymmetric information with a binding limited




































where ∆s = s − s. Let g −→ 0, thus making government resources extremely scarce resulting in
the shadow price λ −→ ∞. Then, (26) writes as
µ < γ − 1
which is the condition stated in (19).
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